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Abstract 
Regulation of the European railway sector remains a central issue in the framework of the 
current liberalization process. From a regulatory perspective, the patchwork of national 
legislations and the delays in transposing and implementing the European Directives bears 
witness to the difficulty of creating a single European railway market. The paper argues that, as a 
result of failing to consider the importance of the technical nature of railways, the notions of 
coordination and regulation are too often looked at from a single perspective – mostly economic 
performance. In fact the type, the scope, the timing and the required institutional setting of 
regulation will differ largely depending on the kind of performances one desires to achieve – 
these can be, among others, financial, social, technical or operational. Policy-makers should 
therefore ask the question “what to regulate for”. The answer to this question not only has 
important implications on the regulation of national rail sectors but also on achieving the creation 
of a single European railway market.  
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1. Introduction 
Regulation of the European railway sector remains a central issue in the framework of the 
current liberalization process. From a regulatory perspective, the patchwork of national 
legislations and the delays in transposing and implementing the European Directives bears 
witness to the difficulty of creating a single European railway market. As noted by Künneke & 
Finger (2009) notwithstanding unbundling, in a technical sense the railway system remains a 
network with a strong degree of complementarity and consequently fundamental coordination 
needs.  For instance, achieving an integrated market rests on ensuring technical interoperability 
across the network (e.g. cross-acceptance of rolling stock, unified signalling). In general, the 
technical aspect of conceiving and running a railway network is left to engineers and only 
remotely included in the system’s overall governance.  
The paper argues that, as a result of failing to consider the importance of the technical nature of 
railways, the notions of coordination and regulation are too often looked at from a single 
perspective – mostly economic performance. Policy-makers should ask the question “what to 
regulate for”? Indeed, the type, the scope, the timing and the required institutional setting of 
regulation will differ largely depending on the kind of performances one desires to achieve – 
these can be, among others, financial, social, technical or operational. The answer to this 
question not only has important implications on the regulation of national rail sectors but also on 
achieving the creation of a single European railway market.  
The paper is divided into five sections. The first section briefly traces back the history of 
European rail and shows that the European railway network is quite specific in international 
comparison. The second section describes the salient points of the European railway 
liberalization program. It highlights the heterogeneous nature of the sector. The next section 
identifies a number of challenges which arise from the confrontation of Europe’s historical 
railways and the current policy objective and liberalization process. It uses as an example of 
governance issue the development and implementation of a new pan-European signalling 
technology – the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS). The fourth section 
describes regulatory objectives (including regulating for economic, operational, social or 
technical performance). The last section asks whether the current regulatory framework answers 
the challenges posed by the fragmentation resulting from the historical and political evolution of 
the sector and how the objective of a European single railway market can be achieved in the 
current institutional setting. It proposed to develop a regulatory governance specific to the 
European railway sector based on a broad notion of performance.  
2. History of European railways 
For the largest part of their history, European rail networks have been conceived, managed and 
regulated at the national level. Gauge, electrification or signaling differed widely across 
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European countries leading to a patchwork of poorly interoperable networks. Little attention was 
paid to [limited] international traffic and at a high cost: special rolling stock had to be conceived 
to circulate on different networks (or altogether changed at the border) while border crossings 
were dealt with via bilateral agreement. For military and industrial reasons some form of public 
control was envisaged in most countries and many imposed their control by legal mandate 
(Campos & Cantos, 2000). Until recently, the most common structure of the rail sector in many 
European countries was the existence of a single publicly-owned firm, in charge of managing 
both the infrastructure and the rail services. 
2.1. Some specificities of the European rail sector 
When compared to other countries (e.g. USA or Japan), European rail appears quite specific. 
First, there is a wide variation in the mix of passenger and freight traffic on the same network 
which influences heavily the practical capacity of railway lines (OECD, 2005)1. As noted by 
Waters (2007) passenger service often involves complex operations with high costs
2
. Systems 
with a higher percentage of passenger traffic (especially dense, urban traffic or high speed 
passengers) are likely to be more sensitive to limits on infrastructure capacity at peak times and 
to service quality than systems based predominantly on freight. The length and complexity of 
national networks varies enormously, ranging from under 3’000KM (e.g., Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands or Denmark) to above 15’000KM (Italy, France, Poland, the United 
Kingdom or Germany)
3 4
. In addition, the more "fragmented" the rail network, i.e. the larger the 
number of railway companies for a given railway infrastructure, the less likely it is that any one 
rail company can provide any given end-to-end service. For much of its history the European 
railway sector developed in a very rigid monopolistic structure under tight State control 
(Stehmann & Zellhofer, 2004). Instead of being managed as commercial enterprises, railway 
firms were assimilated as state authorities. As such they were used for political objectives (e.g. 
investment and employment), came under public service obligations without adequate 
compensation. A high proportion of passenger transport services became unprofitable, but had to 
be maintained for political decisions (public service obligations). The process of debt 
 
1 As freight trains are slower than express passenger trains, a good level of service for passengers may well mean 
that the use of a line for freight trains may be restricted to night hours when no passenger services are running. 
2 Both economic and social considerations influence policies and operations and result in sizeable subsidies. There 
can be several public policy concerns to be reconciled with a desire for efficient management of rail operations. 
3 Complex networks with intense usage normally require more complex systems of access charges if the cost 
response of the system to changes in use is to be accurately represented – due to congestion and scarcity, as well as 
likely diversity of types of trains, rolling stock. 
4 Furthermore, environmental characteristics such as topography and climate can influence the operating costs. In 
many cases, the information is not available for all output and environmental characteristics. Many of these 
characteristics are therefore omitted from the cost function specifications. Moreover, there exist other omitted 
variables such as differences across companies in accounting procedures that are generally not taken into account 
(Farsi, Filippini, & Greene, 2005). 
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accumulation entered a "vicious circle"
5
. The massive indebtedness that ensued was hard to 
overcome since rail entities repeatedly suffered from political interference, both in the short and 
long-term. According to the OECD (1999), the poor performance of railways can, in many 
countries, be attributed to a “soft budget constraint” – partly a result of a lack of transparency in 
the costs of public service obligations
6
. While virtually all national networks were 
interconnected, the network remained highly inefficient and un-coordinated at the European 
level – the national organization of railways acting as a formidable barrier to integration. In the 
1950s the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) diagnosed the “dominance of 
un-coordinated national railway policies as the key problem” (van der Vleuten, Anastasiadou, 
Lagendijk, & Schipper, 2007)
7
. In fact, the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957 considered the 
development of a Common Transport Policy (CTP) pivotal to the European integration process 
(Schot, 2007) – the CTP failed to achieved its objective lead to a ruling of the European Court of 
Justice, the so-called inactivity verdict. 
3. European railway liberalization 
As noted above for much of the 20th century European railways suffered from financial losses 
(usually covered via public subsidies), management inefficiency and an insufficient commercial 
outlook. During the past two decades, European Member States have progressively reformed 
their rail sectors with the goals of reducing state subsidies, enhancing productivity and increasing 
the sovereignty of the market. The resistance to reform from some major stakeholders – national 
operators, trade unions, etc. – was not universal. For instance equipment manufacturers 
interested in expanding their markets, railways interested in alternative ways of exploiting their 
network together with industrial groups interested in operating their own trains welcomed the 
reforming trend. 
In fact, pressures to reform the European railway sector emanated from several levels: national, 
European and world-wide (Puffert, 1995). At the national level, rail traffic  was losing ground to 
road haulage due to the technical incompatibilities, nationally-oriented infrastructure planning 
and time-tabling, poor international cooperation, dominance of political influence impeding 
responses to changing market conditions as well as the increased degree of motorization and the 
 
5 Dramatic debt levels relative to the national public budget was attained in most European states at the end of the 
1980s. 
6 At the time, the OECD encouraged countries to improve the performance of railways and to introduce competition 
by improving commercial incentives and addressing public service obligations. 
7 The Treaty of Rome signed in 1957 considered the development of a Common Transport Policy (CTP) pivotal to 
the European integration process. Railways, together with roads and inland waterways were considered as a core 
competence of the newly established European Economic Community (Treaty articles 74-84). Initial measures were 
directed to modernizing the existing railway system, stimulating cross-border traffic and improving the financial 
situation of railway administration. 
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expansion of the road infrastructure. National rail companies were generally financially 
burdensome due to over-manning in order to fight unemployment, obligation to maintain routes 
for political reasons (public service), innovation and procurement policies in the hands of 
national suppliers, infrastructure planning and construction following  general political 
considerations without tackling profitability or industrial policy aims (high-speed rail). At the 
European level, budgetary pressure and the introduction of single market-principles into the 
transport sector further deteriorated the situation of rail companies. At the global level, 
significant efficiency improvement following railway reforms and re-organization (Staggers Act 
in the USA or restructuring in Japan) together with the broader trend of liberalization added to 
the pressure to reform railways. 
Like in other countries the aim of the European reforms has been the improvement of efficiency 
and competitiveness of the railway system (Nash, 2008)
8
. Reforms were concentrated on the 
introduction of competition into the rail transport market via separation of infrastructure from 
operations (at least in an accounting sense), by the progressive opening up of entry to the market 
for new operators and by rules regarding the allocation of slots and the pricing of infrastructure 
use, administered by an independent regulator. Deregulation in Europe has meant both changes 
in the regulatory structure and a gradual (or complete privatization in the case of the United 
Kingdom) of the former vertically integrated state monopolies. This is all in marked contrast to 
the US, where concentration has been on parallel competition between vertically integrated 
railroads (Nash & Rivera-Trujillo, 2004). 
To create and support markets, new regulatory regimes were set up (Coen, Héritier, & Böllhoff, 
2002). Reforms were initiated by Directive 91/440. The European Commission has published a 
White Paper in 2001 (European Commission, 2001) outlining its ambition to revitalize the sector 
through the introduction of competition – freight was to be fully liberalized by 2007 and 
passenger service by 2012 – and the reform of institutions
9
. The idea was to increase both the 
capacity and the safety of the sector. A ‘first package’ was adopted in 2001 with the objective to 
achieve market opening of rail transport and create a single European railway market. It was 
designed around 3 axes: splitting the infrastructure from the activity of railway transport
10
, 
opening to competition the access to the network and achieving a regionalization of passengers 
regional railway transport. The European Commission then adopted in January 2002 a 'second 
package' of measures to revitalize the railways by rapidly building an integrated European 
railway area. In March 2004 the Commission proposed a third railway package containing 
 
8 Nash identifies four additional objectives: 1) improve rail’s market share in international traffic, 2) clearly 
differentiate the role of government, train operator and infrastructure manager, 3) put inter modal competition on a 
level playing field and 4) introduce direct “on-the-track” competition. 
9 The Commission should adopt a Communication on the Future on Transport in June 2009. 
10 Three different models for separation have emerged in Europe: 1) complete separation, 2) holding company and 
3) separation of key powers. 
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measures to move the European railways forward.  Adopted in October 2007, it introduced open 
access rights for international rail passenger services including cabotage by 2010. 
Some countries preceded the Commission’s effort. In 1988 Sweden, the first country to reform 
its railway market, demanded complete separation of infrastructure from operations and the 
empowerment of regional governments for planning and funding of regional services. The UK 
followed in 1993 with the passing of the Railways Act which led to the franchising of all 
passenger operations to private operators. Germany followed with the creation of Deutsche 
Bahn, a government-held holding company grouping freight, passenger and infrastructure 
services
11
.  
While the European Commission has taken the driving seat in reforming the sector, Member 
States battle hard to retain control on their national networks. In many European countries there 
are important delays in transposing EU regulation into domestic laws and even more delays in 
implementing the new legal frameworks
12
. When looking at the EU in general Member States 
differ in terms of how they have interpreted requirements set by the legislation. As noted by 
Nash (2007), the extent of actual reform does not match the formal transposition of European 
Directives. In fact, the majority of the countries only implemented the EU's minimum 
requirements. The Commission has repeatedly notified Member States for failing to transpose 
Directives.  
There is also a wide diversity in the type of regulatory body adopted: most European countries 
still have a Ministry in charge or no regulatory body with decision-making powers. A handful of 
countries have adopted either a “railway authority” model (dealing primarily with licences, 
safety and other railway-specific administrative tasks) or a special regulatory authority (Austria, 
Germany, Italy, UK, Latvia and the Netherlands). In fact only 3 countries (Germany, Austria and 
the UK) have specially trained staff dealing exclusively with regulatory matters and with far-
reaching powers to enable them to enforce their decisions (IBM, 2007). Some of the EU's new 
Member States, in comparison with many old Member States, had already set up better organized 
regulatory bodies. It is interesting to note that almost all countries that had made relatively good 
progress in terms of opening up their rail transport services markets had Special Regulatory 
Authorities but most of the regulatory bodies had not yet been required to make decisions on 
discrimination cases. 
On the ground, there are large variations in the extent to which railway markets are open to 
potential entrants. Whereas the freight market is open to competition since January 2007 the 
passenger market remains to be open. For the time being international trains circulating in 
 
11 With 280 operators, Germany is the most open market in Europe but Deutsche Bahn retains more than 90% of 
train kilometers (Nash, 2007). 
12 Countries are routinely sanctioned by the Commission for failing to transpose or implement new laws pertaining 
to railways. 
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Europe are operated under joint-venture between national companies (e.g. Cisalpino is a 50-50 
joint-venture between Switzerland’s SBB and Italy’s FS).  With the partial opening of the 
passenger market in 2010, a number of operators have applied for slots outside of their home 
markets
13
.  
Akin to its technical heterogeneity, the deregulation of the railway sector in the EU Member 
States has been driven by different types of economic, institutional and legal concerns. For 
instance, in the United Kingdom the pursuit of a market liberal agenda has dominated while in 
Sweden key concerns have been the need to find new ways to finance investments in the railway 
sector and to increase efficiency through competition. In countries like France and Portugal the 
initial most important factor seems to have been the necessity to act in accordance with EU 
legislation (Alexandersson & Hultén, 2008). While the different Member States are all taking 
divergent paths of liberalization, one can nonetheless note a number of significant changed that 
took place in the European railway landscape since the 90s (see Table 1).  
Table 1: European rail era 
 Previous era (till 1990) Transition era ( 1990-
2005) 
New era (2010) 
Organizational 
structure 
Vertically integrated Voluntary unbundling Mandatory unbundling
14
 
Regulatory policy and 
legislation 
National National with supra-
national transport policy 
and directives 
National with EU Directives 
(railway packages) 
Drivers Public service Public service, productivity 
and financial sustainability 
Public service, productivity, 
financial sustainability, 
environmental concerns 
Market structure Monopoly Monopolistic 
(infrastructure) and market 
(services) segments 
Monopolistic 
(infrastructure) and market 
(services) segments 
Market opening Closed with limited 
international traffic 
Ad hoc opening of domestic 
markets 
Freight open 
Mandated opening of 
passenger market 
Ownership Public ownership
15
 Mostly state-owned State-owned (infrastructure) 
Some private rail companies 
Regulatory 
arrangements 
None (Ministry) None (Ministry) Independent railway 
authority 
Scale Regional and national National to international Increasingly international 
Source: Authors 
 
                                                            
13 Trenitalia has applied for slots to operate a high-speed train in France. 
14 Under the mandatory unbundling, European countries have opted for different options, e.g. Total vertical 
integration Competitive access Vertical separation 
15 Governments generally became system owners during the first half of the twentieth century. 
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While these changes are a welcomed step towards integration of the European railway market, 
the objective is far from reached. Part of the reason is that the European Union has been pushing 
two major but potentially contradictory objectives at the same time: the liberalization of the 
national markets and the creation of an interoperable network. The problem here is that the 
regulatory governance structure necessary to achieve these two objectives differs. In the first 
case, it requires regulation for economic and financial performance. In the second case, it 
requires regulation for technical and operational performance. In fact, as we will see with the 
case study of ERTMS (more below), they actually are opposed. Achieving technical 
interoperability comes at a huge [immediate] cost to railway operators and infrastructure 
managers without really bringing major returns in the short-term. It is clear now that the 
sequencing of standardization and harmonization of the European matters and that it would have 
probably more efficient to harmonized operational rules before technical rules. 
4. Challenges arising from the historical and political perspectives on railways 
While the initial aim/dream to see railways play a central part in the European integration 
process has failed to materialize so far, a new wind seems to be blowing on the European 
railways (increase in traffic, favorable policies driven by environmental concerns, improvements 
in the opening of markets, etc.). But numerous challenges remain before railways can play a 
leading role in EU integration, let alone before the creation of a single European railway market. 
Despite significant progress, a tension remains between Member States and the EU Commission 
when it comes to regulation and, more generally, governance of the railway sector. Recurrent 
delays of Member States in transposing and implementing European Directives pertaining to the 
rail sector attest to the reticence of countries to relinquish authority. It also shows the limits of 
the current institutional setting in which the EU drafts policies that remain at the “good will” of 
Member States. 
In spite of all the integration effort, the European railway sector remains fragmented on several 
levels: 
‐ Technical; problems of interoperability remain due to the technical complexity of the sector 
as well as the size of the network; in order to move the process forward interoperability is 
mandated on high-speed lines and along a number of corridors; conventional rail and 
regional traffic will be addressed at a later stage; 
‐ Financial; despite a notable improvement in the economic situation of many railway 
operators, their financial standing is far from excellent; infrastructure manager are even in a 
worse situation since the charging mechanisms  do not truly reflect costs – government 
subsidies make up for the losses; in the case of ERTMS, funding mechanisms remain divided 
between national countries and the EU; 
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‐ Organizational; the vertically integrated monopolies have been unbundled and are under 
competitive and performance pressure; the centrally-controlled railways are increasingly 
decentralized and run by markets; ownership too is being transformed from one/few actors to 
several actors; at times public ownership is replaced by private or public-private 
arrangements. Some of the barriers to further integration lie in inadequate organizational 
structures to handle changes in task execution, inadequate mandates and lack of willingness 
of national regulators to implement and enforce administrative changes as well as lack of 
resources and willingness of rail undertakings and infrastructure managers to adjust to 
changed market structures; in the case of ERTMS, unbundling has created a “catch 22” 
situation where infrastructure managers and railway undertakings have an incentive to invest 
in the new technology only if the other has done so. In addition, unbundling has modified 
investment cycles as well as the distribution of the burden ; 
‐ Administrative/legal; in virtue of the subsidiarity principle, national railway legislations are 
diverse both in terms of their design and implementation; Kaeding (2007) argues that 
transport directives challenge the regulatory frameworks across member states with the EU 
facing a serious transposition problem, both in terms of delay or precocious 
implementation
16
.  
 
The multi-level of governance (regional, national and supra-national) has created a patchwork of 
stakeholders whose interests are seldom aligned
17
. In the case of the electricity sector, DeBruijne 
(2006) has noted that institutional fragmentation has led to several shifts with reliability 
consequences
18
. In light of these fragmentations, many countries have adopted a purely national 
economic approach to regulation. 
4.1. The case of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) 
Issues in the development and deployment of the pan-European signalling technology (ERTMS) 
illustrate well such fragmentation. One central characteristic of networked systems is the need 
for technical interdependence or compatibility. This means that increasing the competitiveness of 
 
16 In the case of Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of 
charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification, six issues with considerable leeway for 
interpretation can be identified, leading to a potential for 240 different policy combinations that have to be addressed 
one by one. Empirical findings suggest that problems in transposition processes occur in almost 66% of all national 
implementing measures: 47% of national implementing measures have been notified late to the European 
Commission, of which 70% recorded delays of more than six months, with a maximum delay of 4.8 years. The time 
length of missed deadlines varies significantly between member states and between transport sub-sectors (Kaeding, 
2008).  
17 A limited number of strong national railway companies (e.g. DB and SNCF) play a disproportionate role. 
18 Shifts from long-term planning to real-time management, from design to improvisation, from anticipation to 
resilience, from detailed analysis to operator experience and from risk-control to reliability-seeking behavior. 
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the European railway sector cannot rely solely on an economic approach. Measures need to be 
taken to guarantee an interoperable railway system across Europe
19
. A cornerstone in 
establishing such a European-wide technically interoperable railway system rests on the 
signalling system.  
The European railway sector has spent the last 20 years developing a pan-European control and 
command system (ERTMS) that will, in time, enable convoys to run from Sweden to Sicily 
without changing the train set. In fact, ERTMS serves three purposes: improved interoperability 
of the trans-European rail network, the creation of a single market for procurement and the 
optimization of rail operations on a European-wide scale
20
. As such, ERTMS plays a critical role 
in Europe’s railway market integration and liberalization.  
Despite substantial efforts in standardization, there are still important cross-country variations in 
the implementation of interoperability requirements
21
.  Pellegrin (2008) argues that the failure to 
achieve unified specifications and thus an interoperable European network is linked to the 
absence of an industrial project manager. Instead, each equipment manufacturer, in cooperation 
with its historical network, has developed a complete system of specifications. Furthermore, the 
European Commission, nominally in charge of the project has so far shown limited capability in 
managing the large number of European rail stakeholders (see appendix 1).  
Table 2: Phases of ERTMS project 
 Studies and 
specifications 
1989-1997 
Final specifications 
1998-2004 
Roll-out 
2004-2008 (till 2020) 
Technical level  Class P to Class 1 SRS SRS 2.2.2 and 2.3.0 Work on 3.0.0 
Financial level National National National and subventions from EU 
Organizational level Integrated railways Integrated railways Unbundled railways 
Legal level Directive 96/48/EC Directive 2001/16/EC Directive 2004/50/EC Transposition delays 
Stakeholders EEIG, ERRI, EUROSIG UNISIG, CENELEC, AEIF ERA and associations 
Emphasis Engineering Politics Financial 
Source: Adapted from UIC and Winter (2007) and personal interviews. 
                                                            
19 Mulley & Nelson decompose interoperability into technical, corporate, judicial and cultural dimensions (1999). 
20 While the ultimate goal of ERTMS is to ensure the cross-border interoperability, its “side-benefits” are 
numerous: better and safer working conditions for train drivers, savings for railway undertakings in the long-term – 
different signaling systems for various networks are no longer required in the cab – and increasing the capacity 
utilization of the existing rail network – up to 20% through higher speeds and reduced headways. 
21 One should obviously differentiate the standardization of a technical component of the railway system (in this 
case signaling) from its regulation. The case study of ERTMS nonetheless shows that both are nonetheless linked.  
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The case of ERTMS offers a good example of the necessity to address the fragmentation issues – 
or else to run the risk of failing to achieve integration – by including the technical aspect in the 
regulation and governance of the European railway system. As noted the creation of an 
integrated and competitive railway market rests to a large extent on achieving network 
interoperability. ERTMS plays a central part in achieving such interoperability. But the 
deployment of ERTMS is taking place in a different legislative framework than from the past, 
one that requires better coordination
22
. At the same time there is a need for an overall system 
integration: one is looking at the railway system in different ways with 27 “closed” railways 
systems that need to be harmonized. One important question to be tackled is identifying all the 
relevant stakeholders and their respective incentives
23
. In addition, many of these actors do not 
know how to proceed in the new environment where many strategic options are available. 
5. Defining performance in the railway sector 
One important element of the reform process of the railway sector has been the drive to increase 
its efficiency
24
. A large strand of literature has looked at railway performance including some 
testing influence of exogenous factors like regulatory policies (Pedro Cantos & Maudos, 2001; 
Caves & Christensen, 1980), public policies (Oum & Yu, 1994), administrative autonomy 
(Gathon & Pestieau, 1995) and technical efficiency (Cowie, 1999)
25
. For instance, after 
measuring railway performance with adjustment of environmental effects, data noise and slacks 
Lan and Lin (2005) conclude that important policy implications and amelioration strategies for 
operating railways derive from broadening the scope. 
Rodriguez et al. (2007) identify a number of performance measures, including commercial 
efficiency, technical efficiency, financial performance, capital expenditures and cost of capital. 
In many cases, the government and regulator seem to address all these objectives at the same 
time with no particular priority. This is not particularly surprising since different stakeholders, 
private and public, with different scope of action (e.g. competition authority or national safety 
authority) are in charge of a given task which influences performance. An additional difficulty 
comes from the fact that in the past a Ministry of Department of Transport would be in charge of 
optimizing all these performances. Nowadays, the remit of the Ministry has in many ways 
shrunk: their scope of action and authority has been reduced. New agencies have been created, 
 
22 For instance, there has been a separate handling of the two ERTMS components (i.e. GSM-R and ETCS) – for 
now, there is no integration responsibility between ETCS and GSM-R 
23 It is important to keep in mind that many institutional players are not only linked to ERTMS. 
24 Measuring efficiency/performance in the railway sector is made more complex since the firms operate without 
private producers, either because of the particular market structure or because of non commercial objectives which 
are assigned to them (Perelman & Pestieau, 1988). 
25 See also (P. Cantos, Pastor, & Serrano, 1999) for a non-parametric approach to productivity, efficiency and 
technical change in the European railways. 
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e.g. slot allocators, independent regulatory authorities, some as a result of EU-mandated 
Directives, some as the result of domestic reforms. All these organizations have their own 
performance indicators with the risk of creating local optima at the cost of a global sub-optimum. 
Many empiric studies have looked at performance under de-regulation – most of them attempting 
to establish link between reforms and efficiency in railways
26
. Among others studies looked at 
the impact on firms’ financial condition (i.e. revenue vs. cost control), productivity and cost 
efficiency. Studies were also conducted to analyze the impact on customers and shippers.  
There seems to be relatively little consensus about the effect of reforms on efficiency. Friebel, 
Ivaldi and Vibes (2003) find that full separation of infrastructure from operations is not a 
necessary condition for improving railroad efficiency. In a later paper (2008) they find efficiency 
increases when reforms such as third-party network access, introduction of an independent 
regulator and vertical separation are implemented
27
. At the same time, reforms have been found 
to positively impacted railroad’s technical efficiency – higher reform intensity does not 
necessarily increase technical efficiency; rather it depends on sequencing of reforms. In fact, 
railroad is sensitive to changes in the regulatory framework and one-size-fits-all may not be a 
fruitful way to enhance efficiency. 
Regulation can be applied to operational performance – often defined as the capacity, average 
speed and punctuality, safety and the optimized usage of resources – e.g. via measures to 
incentivize operators to improve punctuality (Gibson, 2005; Vromans, Dekker, & Kroon, 2006). 
In many countries punctuality is the main performance indicator
28
. It can also be aimed at social 
performance (Héritier & Schmidt, 2000). In fact, railways tend to be under constant surveillance 
from its stakeholders (Gelders, et al., 2008). Finally, one can regulate for technical performance 
(Janic, 2008; Yu, 2008). While regulation can be geared towards improving all these 
performances, most of it seems to aim for economic efficiency
29
. This emphasis on economic 
regulation can be attributed to the history of financial distress that plagued the railway sector 
during the past decades as well as on the broader trend of liberalization and “retreat of the State” 
that emerged in the 1980s.  
 
26 An increasing number of econometric studies are looking at railway efficiency and performance (Growitsch & 
Wetzel, 2009; Jupe & Crompton, 2006; Smith, 2005; Yu, 2008). 
27 While reforms seem to impact positively technical efficiency, higher reform intensity does not necessarily 
increase technical efficiency which depends more on the sequencing of reforms. This last finding is similar to what 
Wallsten (2002) finds in the telecommunication sector. 
28 Other important measures are information supply in trains and stations and cleanliness of trains and stations 
(Gelders, Galetzka, Verckens, & Seydel, 2008). 
29 Regulation is defined here as a specific form of governance, a set of authoritative rules, often accompanied by 
some administrative agency, for monitoring and enforcing compliance (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004). 
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While there is abundant literature on “individual” performance (e.g. technical efficiency or 
economic efficiency), few authors have addressed the issue of multiple regulatory objectives. For 
instance, Campos & Cantos (2000) identify a number of regulatory scenarios based on different 
modes of unbundling and match them with multiple performance objectives – fiscal, internal 
efficiency, dynamic efficiency, risk minimizing, capacity allocation and equity. Not surprisingly, 
the resulting matrix shows that no single scenario is able to fulfill all objectives at the national 
level, let alone at the EU level. For the OECD (2006) “the general objective of governments with 
respect to the rail sector is to force the end-user prices to be at an efficient level (taking into 
account the price of substitute services) with an optimal level of service quality and variety, a 
high level of productive efficiency (and therefore a minimum level of subsidy), and an on-going 
efficient level of investment and innovation in the rail sector”. 
The last section asks whether the current regulatory framework answers the challenges posed by 
the historical and political evolution of the sector and how these objectives can be combined to 
meet the demands of the various railway stakeholders.  Based on the case study of ERTMS, it 
argues for the need to develop a regulatory governance specific to the European railway sector 
with explicit inclusion of performance objectives (economic, social, technical and operational). 
6. Governance of the European railway system 
While regulation of the railway sector goes back to the end of the 19th century
30
, it has received 
renewed attention with the wave liberalization that started in the mid 1980’s. Early on Puffert 
(1995) had noted that 1) the new distributive functions in rail transport infrastructure planning 
and non-discriminatory track allocation control would require the creation of a new regulatory 
mechanism at the European level and that 2) the separation of infrastructure and operation would 
lead to important changes in the logic of international interest representation.  
As seen above, regulation and control of railways was relatively homogeneous across Europe 
until the 1990s. The economic characteristics of the railways sector (e.g. idea of natural 
monopoly) meant that a national monopolistic operator was under price and service regulation to 
protect the general interest. In practice, demand was often to be met at any cost and for an 
accessible price. Limited competition was held at bay since “the preservation of the national 
character of the industry was considered the key factor governing the overall regulation”.  
Over time governments have increasingly become consumers rather than builders of large-scale 
systems (such as telecommunications or electricity networks). They nonetheless retain a number 
 
30 Many regulatory questions (pricing, competition, safety, etc.) had to be addressed in the United States. They led 
to the creation of a state railroad commissions in the middle of the 18th century. In 1886, the US Supreme Court 
ruled that commerce originating or ending outside the boundaries of a state could not be regulated by that state, even 
though the federal government provided no alternative means of regulation (McCraw, 1984). 
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of prerogatives such as setting policy objectives such as efficiency, coherence, flexibility or 
fairness (Abbate, 1999)
31
 . 
Governance of the railway sector has been addressed at the national level but much less at the 
European level. In fact, railway has notably lagged behind other network industries (e.g. 
electricity or telecommunication) when it comes to legislation at the EU level – the Commission 
disposed of only limited legal and institutional powers in order to overcome the resistance of the 
Member States
32
. This mostly comes from the fact that for most of its history, railways were 
conceived and managed almost exclusively at the national level. Given the limited cross-border 
traffic, there was no real need to coordinate otherwise than through bilateral relations
33
. 
There is a vast literature on regulatory governance, including one that deals explicitly with 
network industries like railways (Coen & Windhoff-Héritier, 2005; Correa, 2006) or with multi-
level settings like Europe (Doern & Johnson, 2006; Majone, 1996; Rodrigo, Allio, & Andres-
Amo, 2009)
34
.  A number of authors have proposed typologies for the regulatory governance in 
network industries (Finger & Varone, 2006; Thatcher & Coen, 2008). Finger, Groenewegen et al. 
(2005) argue that for ensuring satisfactory functioning of any infrastructure requires coherence 
between the technical and institutional governance. Stern and Holder (1999) make a clear 
distinction between the objectives of infrastructure regulation (i.e. its purposes and functions) 
and the specific institutional framework for regulation in any given country. Merkert (2007) 
notes that it may be efficient to have different governance structures for different rail tasks as 
well as for different types of train operation and infrastructure provision. 
One question therefore is what kind of regulatory framework to put in place at the EU level to 
ensure that the European railway sector remains manageable from a regulatory perspective and 
that the objective of a single European market for rail is achieved. The governance of railway 
networks is made ever more difficult by the addition of a supra-national authority (EC) which 
passes Directives that need to be transposed and implemented into national legislation. The real 
difficulty lies in the fact that Member-States are often reluctant to give up control of their 
domestic railway sector. 
 
31 Abbate identifies a number of network characteristics which pose particular governance problems, including the 
interconnection of independent systems and geographic spread. 
32 The resistance to Brussel’s intervention into domestic railway policies is diminishing but still strong. 
33 Such a bilateral approach is still used in cross-acceptance of rolling stock, although there are signs that 
coordination is done at the corridor-level and even at the multinational level – in part because of the work from 
ERA. 
34 The heterogeneous technical nature of the current European railway network makes the comparison with other 
network industries/large-scale systems very hard/irrelevant. The aviation sector has a history of more than 50 years 
of international/global cooperation to standardize operations. In the telecommunication sector, which has a long 
history of standardization at the international level (e.g. via ITU), the hopes to create a pan-European regulator have 
been dashed.  
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As noted by Steenhuisen & van Eeten (2008) “realizing multiple public values in a large scale 
technological system (such as railways) requires a myriad of trade-offs because realizing one 
value can directly affect, postpone or thwart the realization of other values”. Governance should 
address questions of ownership, organizational form, methods of regulator or market design but 
also take into consideration the technical aspect of railways
35
. At the same time, it is important to 
recognize that no framework will be able to satisfy the governance needs of an evolving sector. It 
is also important to keep in mind that incremental policies at the national level may be more 
effective than grand designs.  
Geradin and Petit (2004) identify and call for some key principles of good governance for sound 
regulation of network industries – independence, accountability, judicial accountability, financial 
accountability, political accountability and performance’ accountability. The key question is at 
what level these principles should be enforced, i.e. at the EU level, at the Member State level or a 
mix between the two with guidelines established at the EU level and enforced by Member States. 
As noted, the liberty given to Member States to organize the regulation of their national railway 
sector has led to great heterogeneity. For instance Belgium created two separate bodies – one 
allocation body and one regulatory body. The creation of National Safety Authorities (in charge 
of certifying different processes such as locomotives homologation) only reinforces 
heterogeneity.  
The establishment of agencies at the European level is one of the most notable recent 
developments in EU regulatory policy (Keleman, 2002). Their governance has recently received 
a wide coverage in the academic literature (Dehousse, 2008; Thatcher & Coen, 2008; Trondal & 
Jeppesen, 2008)
36
. While acknowledging the importance of agencies in implementing European 
legislation, Groenleer et al. (2008) point out that it can only happen in cooperation with Member 
States, the Commission and international bodies. Dehousse (2008) actually questions the 
emergence of a strong regulator given the existence of multiple principals (Parliament, 
Commission and Member-States). 
In the railway sector, the creation of agencies at the Member State has usually  lagged behind 
other network industries since rail came rather late in the liberalization process (or had to face 
major opposition)
37
. Coen and Thatcher (2007) argue that the EC and national regulators 
maintain controls over European regulatory networks (ERNs).  
 
35 Bauer & Schneider (2008) make a distinction between the social and the technical subsystem and include 4 layers 
of design issues: embeddedness, institutional environment, governance and resource allocation. 
36 Thatcher and Coen propose a typology for implementing European regulations based on 8 types of coordination – 
EU-supervised national implementation, forum governance, informal networks of IRAs, European networks of 
regulators, European regulatory agencies, federal European regulatory agencies, single European regulator and 
direct regulation by the Commission. 
37 Most formal governance structures and safeguards were exogenously drafted by political decision makers. 
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The study of ERTMS leads to a similar conclusion: while ERA is not a regulatory agency per se, 
it plays, together with the other railway stakeholders (industry associations and their members), a 
strong regulatory role but only to a certain point. It therefore finds itself in a weak position with a 
limited set of powers and strong oversight. That said, in the aftermath of the train accident of 
Viareggio, the EU Transport Commissioner Antonio Tajani announced that he wishes to set up a 
«European control system» for rail transport and the transport of hazardous goods. With the 
liberalization of rail freight transport, «we must move from national control systems to a 
European system”. The question of performance is inextricably linked to the one of governance.  
7. Conclusion 
While started in the 1950s and despite a lot of good will, the efforts of European countries to 
create a unified railway network have encountered many obstacles. Problems of achieving single 
European rail market stem, among others, from the legacy of heterogeneous networks built over 
more than a century with a predominant national focus, from the lack of alignment between the 
EU-driven liberalization of the railway market and domestic reforms (as witnessed by 
transposition issues). The disappointing progress can also be attributed to the insufficient 
institutional response to the rail transport policy (bridging policy with a governance framework 
at the EU level).  
The current lack of coordination between national railways is addressed by the centralization of a 
certain number of activities, e.g., directives on harmonization, cross-acceptance as well as the 
creation of ERA. While a step in the right direction, the limited powers granted to ERA (typical 
of the EU “agencification” trend) shows the difficulty in creating an institutional framework – in 
part cause by the reluctance of Member-States to give up authority on their national networks. 
Today, Member-States, their Notifying Bodies (NBs) and National Safety Authorities (NSAs) 
are not fully in charge anymore but the EU has not been able to fill the gap. Moreover, it makes 
little doubt that the piecing together of railway policies conceived at the national level will fail to 
create a European optima. 
The failure to create a supra-national regulatory body for the telecommunication sector does not 
bode well for the creation of a similar agency for rail. One of the key questions is whether the 
regulatory tasks of ERA, currently limited to safety, interoperability and ERTMS, will be 
extended to further regulatory activities. The difficulties in developing and deploying ERTMS 
can be seen more as a symptom – rather than the cause – of governance weakness in the EU 
railway system. The current governance weakness poses not only a risk of regulatory divergence 
but also of “real” risk (e.g. Viaregio incident). The question of performance is not restricted to 
the railways sector. Other network industries, like the electricity sector, under similar 
transformations and face similar issues.  
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Through the study of ERTMS, the paper has tried to show that the creation of a single railway 
market requires a different approach to governance of the European railway network. For 
instance, before thinking of regulatory agencies or regulatory mechanism, one should consider 
deciding on what performance one wants to achieve. Too often, the overriding goal of regulating 
for economic performance clouds a broader set of issues that need to be regulated 
(environmental, social, operational) as well. 
In the future, the European railway sector will have to deal with managing traffic increase, 
achieving objectives of energetic and environmental efficiency, ensuring continuous 
interoperability and further market opening
38
. Hence, governance and, by extension regulation, 
will need to reflect/integrate the dynamic aspect of the industry and of the reforms.  
 
 
38 The notion that interoperability is “not a one-off, absolute state, rather it is a dynamic set of circumstances which 
will change through time in ways which alter the effectiveness with which different systems are able to work 
together”. This is particularly important when thinking about the governance and regulation of the European railway 
system: as one cannot expect the 27+ national railway systems to achieve interoperability at the same time on the 
different dimensions, one cannot expect interoperability to remain static. 
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Appendix 1: ERTMS ETCS Ecosystem 
Figure 1: ERTMS ETCS Ecosystem (without GSM-R) 
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Source: Adapted from Querzè (2007) and personal interviews. 
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Appendix 2: The European Railway Agency (ERA) 
Coming in the footsteps of the European Association for Railway Interoperability (AEIF), the 
European Railway Agency (ERA) was set up to help create an integrated railway area by 
reinforcing safety and interoperability
39, 40. Its main task is to develop economically viable 
common technical standards and approaches to safety, working closely with railway sector 
stakeholders, national authorities and other concerned parties, as well as with the European 
institutions.  
The Commission has mandated ERA to perform certain activities under Directives 96/48/EC and 
2001/16/EC. This includes: 1) preparing the review and updating of TSIs and making any 
recommendations to take account of developments in technology or social requirements (e.g. 
those who indicate the exact format of the messages which have to be exchanged between the 
track and the train); 2) contributing to the development and implementation of rail 
interoperability – ensure that the TSIs are adapted to technical progress and market trends and to 
the social requirements; 3) monitoring progress with the interoperability of the railway systems; 
4) examining from the point of view of interoperability, any railway infrastructure project. It is 
expected that these measures will gradually create an open market for rail products and systems, 
create true operational rail interoperability at a European level, and reduce the high costs and 
burdens currently being experienced from the perpetuation of specific national technical 
solutions and systems.  
In practice, the Agency also acts as the system authority for ERTMS
41
. The two main axes of 
ERA as system authority are: 1) configuration and quality control which includes repository of 
all specifications, quality review, cross check, consistency and gap identification and 2) system  
evolution and change management which includes baseline planning, system version 
management and backward compatibility. The EC will also be able to ask the agency for 
assistance in the evaluation, as far as interoperability is concerned, of projects eligible for 
Community financial support. As such, ERA plays a central role in the current and future 
technical development of ERTMS
42
.  In fact, one can argue that the creation of the agency and 
its important “technical” work is partly addressing the inclusion of technical regulatio
 
39 In September 2006, the European Association for Railway Interoperability (AEIF) officially transferred all its 
documentation to the European Railway Agency. AEIF was the joint representative body mandated by the EU 
Commission to lay down the Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs). 
40 The regulation 881/2004 of the European Parliament and the Council dated 29 April 2004 established the 
European Railway Agency, and defined its responsibilities and working methods (Lochman, 2009). 
41 ERA is also in charge of establishing transparent processes to manage the ERTMS system changes. 
42 In the framework of the standard’s evolution process, which is under ERA’s responsibility, there has been an 
attempt by ERA (led by the ERTMS unit manager) to take the lead in the next standard release via the creation of a 
working group. The attempt failed due to a general blockage of the stakeholders. 
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However, the fact that ERA is considered as the system authority does not reduce potential 
conflicts of interests within the ERTMS ecosystem. The agency’s scope/depth of action is also 
under question. The appointment of European coordinators to facilitate the coordinated 
deployment of ERTMS in corridors can be interpreted as an attempt to bridge the gap between 
ERA’s technical and political work, and the actual deployment
43
.  At the same time it shows the 
limitation of the institutional framework which struggles to manage the transition of an 
innovation from development to deployment.  
Moreover, the double-headed approach is contradictory:  the coordinators’ mandate is more 
geared towards short-term success (deployment via corridors) than towards long-term 
sustainability (standards). In practice, ERA finds itself in a situation where it plays both a 
technical and as political role, which places additional pressure on the agency both from the EC 
and the ERTMS coordinators. 
While the technical competence of ERA is not in question, this cannot be said of the current 
institutional arrangement which leaves ERA devoid of legislative or regulatory powers – it only 
submits opinions and recommendations to the European Commission
44
. Second, the gap between 
technical coordination and actual deployment is hardly filled by ERA. The “reality of corridors” 
never reaches ERA –to minimize transaction costs, ERA doesn’t work with individual suppliers 
but representative organizations, e.g. UNIFE, UNISIG. Third, the standardization process itself 
poses a problem – going back and forth between ERA and Member States. Last, investment 
decisions are still made at the local and national level which distorts incentives. There is 
therefore a risk of ending up with very good interoperability inside one country/along one 
corridor
45
 but not across countries.  
 
 
43 The coordinators’ role consists in facilitating the preparation of coherent and economically viable deployment 
plans (through corridors) and pinpointing any problems in the implementation of these plans (European 
Commission, 2005). A number of measures are envisaged, including technical harmonization, efficient and reliable 
path allocation rules and processes, traffic management, transparency on infrastructure, consistence in performance 
schemes for quality of service, cooperation between national regulatory bodies and governance. But even the 
corridor-based approach runs the risk of creating inter-corridor interoperability issues, limiting the “liquidity” of 
rolling-stock and postponing the ideal of a single (unified) railway market. 
44 It may also send technical opinions to the European Commission or Member States’ Committees. ERA is also 
working with representatives (suppliers) to write down a legislation imposing them what to develop, a sign that the 
agency is establishing its power 
45 The Commission adopted an action plan to develop a rail network giving priority to freight by applying the 
corridor-based strategy and presenting ideas to be developed concerning aspects of corridor governance, 
management and operation. 
